Thanks
It is a great honor and a great pleasure to be here
today (Panama City), and to take part in the third CUMIPAZ.
I would like to thank you very much, and to thank especially
Dr. Camilo, in my personal name and on behalf of the jurisdiction I represent,
The African Court of Human and People’s Rights.
The struggle for Peace has many facets intimately intertwined
with each other. Justice and Democracy are examples.
If Humanity has known in a single century (the XXth)
two world conflicts which, under the terms of the UN Charter, have caused “unspeakable
suffering”, it is because of the absence of justice and totalitarian, racist
and violent regimes.
If, today, Humanity continue to experience wars,
genocides, ethnic cleansing, massive violations of human rights, it is because Justice
and Democracy do not fulfill their role.
For this CUMIPAZ, you asked me to speak on the Challenges
of International Justice detecting warning signals and prevention of genocidal atrocity.
I may be disappointing because the results are not brilliant.
Definitions of Genocide
Genocide Prevention is any act or actions that works
toward averting a future genocide. One of the main goals of the United Nations
with the Genocide Convention of 1948, is to prevent future genocides from
taking place. Since genocides take much planning, many resources and involved
parties to be carried out, they do not just happen instantaneously.
Using risk assessments, policy makers and NGO's can
predict how at risk a country is for genocide. From this assessment of the
risk, appropriate steps can be taken to stop a situation from evolving into a
genocide. The overriding aim of genocide prevention is to prevent genocide
entirely before a crisis or violence begins.
Otherwise, it is up to international justice, which
takes place after a genocide has ended, to focus on preventing another genocide
in the future.
Justice for the victims also plays a major role in
repairing communities to prevent a future genocide from occurring. This justice
can take various forms but it is, until now, still imperfect. Some common
criticisms of trials are the retro-activity, selectivity, highly politicized
nature that trials often have. That is why there is an increased risk of
atrocity reoccurring. These are some of the challenges of prevention of
genocidal atrocities, when we deal with international justice.
As a matter of fact, we can advance this generic
definition of Genocide: it’s the crime of destroying or conspiring to destroy a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
Genocide can be committed in a number of ways,
including killing members of a group or causing them serious mental or bodily
harm, deliberately inflicting conditions that will bring about a group's
physical destruction, imposing measures on a group to prevent births, and
forcefully transferring children from one group to another.
Since the Second World War, definition and prevention
of Genocide in International law knew an evolution, , through the three following
texts:
1. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution
96 (I) (11 December 1946)
According to this resolution, Genocide is: “a
denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the
denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the
right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, (…) and is contrary to
moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations”.
The General Assembly, therefore, affirms that genocide
is “a crime under international law…whether the crime is committed on
religious, racial, political or any other grounds”.
2. The
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG)
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948 and came into effect on
12 January 1951 (Resolution 260 (III)
According to its Article 2, is considered as Genocide,
“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
“a) killing members of the group;
“b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
e) forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group”.
3. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court signed in 1998 and effective in 2002
Article 6 of the Statute provides that "Genocide"
means “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group”.
While there are various definitions of the term,
almost all international bodies of law officially adjudicate the crime of
genocide pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) of 1948.
These definitions are generally regarded by the
majority of genocide scholars to have an "intent to destroy"
as a requirement for any act to be labelled genocide; there is also growing agreement
on the inclusion of the physical destruction criterion.
On the other hand, when we deal with international
justice, it does not mean that an international justice does exist but we are
referring to International institutions and organisms that represent
international justice, especially after the Second World War and the adoption
of the UN Charter which aims, above all, to keep peace throughout the world,
develop friendly relations between nations and help countries to settle their
differences by peaceful means.
That is why, international mechanisms of international
justice were created through both permanent (like International Court of
Justice, International Criminal Court, etc.) and ad’hoc jurisdictions
(like International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) to avoid more wars, crimes and
atrocities in the World.
These are the main important International
jurisdictions that had created, progressively, an innovative jurisprudence,
which tried to prevent genocidal atrocities in the World, putting the light on
the illegality of such atrocities, punishing the ones who ordered and executed
these International crimes, and referring to a progressive evolution of
International law, International humanitarian law and International criminal
law.
The aim of this paper is to focus on the challenges
facing International justice, in order to prevent Genocide, making reference to
the evolution of the Jurisprudence of the ICJ from 1951 to 2015 (I) and
the role of both ad hoc criminal jurisdictions in Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda and the permanent ICC in this evolution (II).
I- EVOLUTION OF THE JURISPUENCE OF THE ICJ AND
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE
The International Court of justice is the chief
judicial agency of the United Nations, established in 1945 to decide disputes
arising between nations. It is the primary judicial organ of the United
Nations, based in The Hague, Netherlands. Its main functions are to settle
legal disputes submitted to it by states and to provide advisory opinions on
legal questions submitted to it by duly authorized international organs,
agencies, and the UN General Assembly.
The ICJ had three main occasions to formulate its jurisprudence
on the subject of the crime of Genocide, in 1951, 2007 and 2015.
-
I.C.J. Advisory Opinion of 28 May1951, Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
First, there was the advisory opinion on the
Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 1951, in which the court had to decide whether the state-party to
the 1948 Genocide Convention whose reservation is considered as contrary to the
object and purpose of the Convention could be regarded as party to the
Convention.
The question concerning reservations to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide had been referred for
an advisory opinion to the Court by the General Assembly of the United Nations
(G.A. resolution of November 16, 1950.
In its Opinion, the Court begins by refuting the
arguments put forward by certain Governments against its competence to exercise
its advisory functions in the present case. The Court then dealt with the
questions referred to it, after having noted that they were expressly limited
to the Convention on Genocide and were purely abstract in character.
The first question refers to whether a State, which
has made a reservation, can, while maintaining it, be regarded as a party to
the Convention on Genocide, when some of the parties object to the reservation.
In its treaty relations, a State cannot be bound without its consent. A
reservation can be effected only with its agreement. On the other hand, it is a
recognized principle that a multilateral Convention is the result of an
agreement freely concluded. To this principle was linked the notion of
integrity of the Convention as adopted, a notion which, in its traditional
concept, involved the proposition that no reservation was valid unless it was
accepted by all contracting parties.
The second question refers to the character of the reservations,
which may be made, and the objections, which may be raised thereto? According
to the Court, the solution must be found in the special characteristics of the
Convention on Genocide. The principles underlying the Convention are recognized
by civilized nations as binding on States even without any conventional
obligation. It was intended that the Convention would be universal in scope.
Its purpose is purely humanitarian and civilizing. The contracting States do
not have any individual advantages or disadvantages nor interests of their own,
but merely a common interest. This leads to the conclusion that the object and
purpose of the Convention imply that it was the intention of the General
Assembly and of the States, which adopted it, that as many States as possible
should participate. Consequently, because of its abstract character, the
appraisal of a reservation and the effect of objections depend upon the
circumstances of each individual case.
The Court then examined the question by which it was
requested to say what was the effect of a reservation as between the reserving
State and the parties, which object to it and those, which accept it. According
to the Court, the same considerations apply. No State can be bound by a
reservation to which it has not consented, and therefore each State, based on
its individual appraisals of the reservations, within the limits of the
criterion of the object and purpose stated above, will or will not consider the
reserving State to be a party to the Convention.
The Court finally turned to the last question
concerning the effect of an objection made by a State entitled to sign and
ratify but which had not yet done so, or by a State which has signed but has
not yet ratified. According to the Court, in the former case, it would be
inconceivable that a State possessing no rights under the Convention could
exclude another State. The case of the signatory States is more favorable. They
have taken certain steps necessary for the exercise of the right of being a
party. This provisional status confers upon them a right to formulate as a
precautionary measure objection, which have themselves a provisional character.
If signature is followed by ratification, the objection becomes final.
Otherwise, it disappears. Therefore, the objection does not have an immediate
legal effect but expresses and proclaims the attitude of each signatory State
on becoming a party.
-
I.C.J. Judgement of 26 February 2007, Case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina V. Serbia and Montenegro)
The first case that was in direct relation with genocidal
atrocities was the case concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro) of 26 February 2007. In this case, the Court
affirmed that it has jurisdiction; Serbia has not committed genocide; Serbia
has not conspired to commit genocide, nor incited the commission of genocide; Serbia
has not been complicit in genocide; Serbia has violated the obligation to
prevent the Srebrenica genocide; Serbia has violated its obligations under the
Genocide Convention by having failed to transfer Ratko Mladić to ICTY; Serbia
has violated its obligation to comply with the provisional measures ordered by
the Court.
According to the Court, Serbia's violations of its obligations stem not only from the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide but also from two
"provisional protective measures" issued by the International Court
of Justice in April and September 1993. Then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
ordered explicitly “to do everything in its power to prevent the crimes of
genocide and to make sure that such crimes are not committed by military or
paramilitary formations operating under its control or with its support”.
The judges concluded that despite this explicit order, Serbia did nothing in
July 1995 to prevent the Srebrenica massacre, although it "should
normally have been aware of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be
committed".
In reaching this decision, the court referred to the standard set by Nicaragua v. United States, in which the United States was found not to be legally responsible for the actions of the Contra
guerillas despite their common
goal and widely publicized support.
Furthermore, according to the ICJ's judgment, "it is established by
overwhelming evidence that massive killings in specific areas and detention
camps throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina were perpetrated during
the conflict" and that "the victims were in large majority
members of the protected group, the Bosniaks, which suggests that they may have been systematically targeted by the
killings". Moreover, it has been established by
fully conclusive evidence that members of the protected group were
systematically victims of massive mistreatment, beatings, rape and torture
causing serious bodily and mental harm, during the conflict and, in particular,
in the detention camps. The Court accepted that these acts, on the part of the
Serb forces, had been committed, but that there was inconclusive evidence of
the specific intent to destroy the Bosniaks as a group in whole or in part.
This includes the period up to 19 May 1992, when Bosnian Serb forces were under the formal control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
ICJ President, Dame Rosalyn Higgins, noted that while there was substantial evidence of events in Bosnia
and Herzegovina that may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, the Court had no jurisdiction to make findings
in that regard, as the case dealt "exclusively with genocide in a
limited legal sense and not in the broader sense sometimes given to this term”.
The Court further decided that, following Montenegro's Declaration of
independence in May 2006, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro's successor, was the only Respondent party in the case, but that "any
responsibility for past events involved at the relevant time the
composite State of Serbia and Montenegro”.
In reviewing the case in the judgment of Jorgić
v. Germany on 12 July 2007
the European Court of Human Rights quoted from the ICJ ruling on the Bosnian
Genocide Case to explain that ethnic cleansing was not enough on its own to establish that a genocide had occurred.
- I.C.J.
Judgement of 3 February 2015, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
In 2015, the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) was
heard before the International Court of Justice.
The Republic of Croatia filed the suit against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 2 July 1999, citing Article IX of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. With the
transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into Serbia and Montenegro
and the dissolution of that country in 2006, Serbia is considered its legal
successor.
The Republic of Serbia counterfeited a suit charging
the Republic of Croatia with genocide, on 4 January 2010. The application
covers missing people, killed people, refugees, expelled people and all
military actions and concentration camps with historical account of World War
II persecution of Serbs committed by the Independent State of Croatia. Both
applications had a financial aspect, seeking compensation of damages.
On 3 February 2015, the International Court of Justice
ruled that neither Serbia nor Croatia proved sufficient evidence that either
side committed genocide, thereby dismissing both cases. This decision raised a
lot of objections and criticism.
In fact, although the International Court of Justice
has taken 16 years to decide that neither Serbia nor Croatia have a case
against each other; the judgment is nevertheless of interest for several
reasons.
Firstly, it reminds us that the ICJ is primarily a
judicial organ, but its decisions have no binding force except between the
parties and only for that case.
Secondly, it reminds us of the politically charged
nature of the definition of genocide even in a court of law.
Because the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide (1948) entails a particular definition of genocide,
which is quite narrow.
In the present ICJ case, both Serbia and Croatia have
sought to expand this definition to cover crimes, which in some cases have been
characterized as genocidal acts, possibly of ethnic cleansing, but not genocide
per se.
The ICJ has determined that despite the fact that
while some acts carried out on both sides constituted the actus reas
(intent) to commit genocide, the Court could not establish the dolus
specialis (specific intent) to commit genocide.
The ICJ draw on the jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and notes that the ICTY has never
charged an individual with a count of genocide committed against Croats between
1991 and 1995.
In essence, the ruling of the ICJ that neither
Serbia's claim nor Croatia's counterclaim constitute genocide, is not so much
evidence of the court's weakness, as rather symptomatic of the difficulty
inherent in the Genocide Convention itself.
This is principally due to the very narrow definition
of genocide as requiring proof of specific intent to destroy a religious,
national, ethnical or racial group in whole, or in part. The ICJ has found no
such specific intent in the case.
Ultimately, this case shows the politically motivated
nature of the claims and counterclaims by both Serbia and Croatia, which cannot
be upheld legally.
While the judgment is arguably of reasonable length,
one can wonder whether it could not have been much shorter. Indeed, given the
finding that the mental element of genocide (specific intent) was absent, what
was the legal relevance of spending such a large chunk of the judgment on
listing the crimes that were committed? If the ICJ did it, may be because it
gives the symbolic impression of addressing some of the concerns of the
victims, by documenting their suffering, even when rejecting all the claims. However,
one can wonder whether this is the role of the ICJ from a judicial point of
view.
II- INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURTS AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE
The competence of the international criminal courts
both ad’hoc and permanent in punishing those who committed, ordered or
executed the crime of Genocide was the main way to prevent such atrocities not
to be committed in the future.
The evolution of the International criminal courts’
jurisprudence, during the three last decades in this respect, was just
courageous and meaningful. Nearing the completion of their mandates, both types
of tribunals have contributed detail, nuance and precedent to the application
of the law of genocide.
-
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)
In 1993, in response to massive atrocities in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations Security Council created the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It was the
first international criminal tribunal since Nuremberg and the first ever
mandated to prosecute the crime of genocide.
Since its establishment in 1993 (Resolution 827 of the
United Nations Security Council-25 May 1993), it has irreversibly changed the
landscape of international humanitarian law and provided victims an opportunity
to voice the horrors they witnessed and experienced.
It has jurisdiction over four clusters of crimes
committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991: grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide,
and crimes against humanity.
A total of 161 persons were indicted; the final
indictments were issued in December 2004, the last of which were confirmed and
unsealed in the spring of 2005. The final fugitive, Goran Hadžić, was arrested
on 20 July 2011. The ICTY is slated to close upon the completion of the
remaining trials of first instance (as of October 2016, there is only one–that
of Ratko Mladić) and any appeal proceedings that had been initiated prior to 1
July 2013. Any appeal proceedings initiated since 1 July 2013 have been under
the jurisdiction of a successor body, the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals.
In its precedent-setting decisions on genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, the Tribunal has shown that an individual’s
senior position can no longer protect them from prosecution. It has now shown
that those suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for atrocities committed
can be called to account. The Tribunal has contributed to an indisputable
historical record, combating denial and helping communities come to terms with
their recent history.
For example, it has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt that the mass murder at Srebrenica was genocide. Judges have also ruled
that rape was used by members of the Bosnian Serb armed forces as an instrument
of terror.
While the most significant number of cases heard at
the Tribunal have dealt with alleged crimes committed by Serbs and Bosnian
Serbs, the Tribunal has investigated and brought charges against persons from
every ethnic background. Convictions have been secured against Croats, as well
as both Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians for crimes committed against Serbs
and others.
While its judgments demonstrate that all parties in
the conflicts committed crimes, the Tribunal regards its fairness and
impartiality to be of paramount importance. It takes no side in the conflict
and does not attempt to create any artificial balance between different groups.
Evidence is the basis upon which the Prosecution presents a case. The Judges
ensure a fair and open trial, assessing the evidence to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
The ICTY has charged over 160 persons. Those indicted
by the ICTY include heads of state, prime ministers, army chiefs-of-staff,
interior ministers and many other high- and mid-level political, military and
police leaders from various parties to the Yugoslav conflicts. Its indictments
address crimes committed from 1991 to 2001 against members of various ethnic
groups in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
-
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
In response to devastating violence in Rwanda, the
Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) on 8 November 1994. It was formally closed on 31 December 2015. The
Tribunal had a mandate to prosecute persons bearing great responsibility for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in Rwanda between 1 January and 31 December 1994.
The first trial
started in January 1997, and by December 2012, the Tribunal had completed the
trial phase of its mandate. During its two decades of work in Arusha, Tanzania,
the ICTR sentenced 61 people to terms of up to life imprisonment for their
roles in the massacres. Fourteen accused were acquitted and 10 others
referred to national courts. The ICTR held 5,800 days of proceedings, indicted
93 people, issued 55 first-instance and 45 appeal judgments, and heard the powerful
accounts of more than 3,000 witnesses who recounted some of the most traumatic
events imaginable during ICTR trials.
The Mechanism for
International Criminal Tribunals, set up by the Security Council in December
2010, took over the remaining tasks of the ICTR (same as for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Mechanism plays an
essential role in ensuring that the ICTR’s closure does not leave the door open
to impunity for the remaining fugitives. The ICTR branch of the Mechanism began
to function on 1 July 2012.
The Tribunal has
issued several landmark judgments, including:
·
In the first judgment by an international court on genocide, a former
mayor, Jean-Paul Akayesu, was convicted in 1998 of nine counts of
genocide and crimes against humanity. The judgment was also the first to
conclude that rape and sexual assault constituted acts of genocide insofar as
they were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a targeted
group.
·
The conviction of the prime minister during the genocide, Jean
Kambanda, to life in prison in 1998 was the first time a head of government
was convicted for the crime of genocide.
·
The Tribunal’s "Media Case" in 2003 was the first judgment since
the conviction of Julius Streicher at Nuremberg after World War II to
examine the role of the media in the context of international criminal justice.
-
The International Criminal Court (I.C.C.)
In 1998, the
Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC) established the first
permanent International Criminal Court, which is an autonomous international
organization, unaffiliated to any main UN organ. Although the ICC signed a
cooperation agreement with the UN, its judicial body does not enjoy the same
support from UNSC as the two UN ad hoc tribunals (International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda). The ICC has to rely on State cooperation and has no coercive means of
its own to apprehend indicted persons.
Since its creation in 1998 and
the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002[1], this
Court is competent for crime of Genocide which take place after this date.
The Court is participating in a global
fight to end impunity, and through international criminal justice, the Court
aims to hold those responsible accountable for their crimes and to help prevent
these crimes from happening again.
The
Court cannot reach these goals alone. As a court of last resort, it seeks to
complement, not replace, national Courts. Governed by an international treaty
called the Rome Statute, the ICC is the world’s first permanent international
criminal court.
There have thus far been 24 cases before
the Court, with some cases having more than one suspect.
ICC
judges have issued 30 arrest warrants. Thanks to cooperation from States, 8
persons have been detained in the ICC detention centre and have appeared before
the Court. 14 persons remain at large. Charges have been dropped against 3
persons due to their deaths.
ICC
judges have also issued 9 summonses to appear.
The
judges have issued 6 verdicts: 9 iconvictions and 1 acquittal.
The Rome Statute’s drafting process and the ICC’s
ongoing case against the president of Sudan have added further clarifications
to the international law of genocide.
Indeed, the International Criminal Court first
indicted the Sudanese head of State, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, in March 2009
for the crimes committed by the Sudanese Armed Forces, the National Intelligence
and Security Service, and affiliated Arab militias in the course of the Darfur
civil war that broke out in early 2003.
Since March 2005, former ICC chief prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo opened six cases indicting mainly members of the Government. Yet,
ICC chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced in December 2014, that war crimes
investigations in Darfur were coming to a halt due to the lack of support from
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and from the United Nations-African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). These defects came to light in the process of
issuing the second arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, which damaged the Court’s
legitimacy and resulted in the current halt of war crimes investigations in
Darfur. That is why; African States have been resisting the ICC and its chief
prosecutor. Between 15 July 2013 and 23 January 2015 only, another Pre-Trial
Chamber (PTC) of the ICC issued nineteen decisions related to Al-Bashir’s
travels and restating States’ obligation to arrest him, with no success.
An extra-legal explanation of this failure is that the
PTC-I and the chief prosecutor never expressed frankly their strategic move
based on the Genocide Convention but instead relied on the highly questionable
above-mentioned binding effect of the UNSC referral to the ICC. Indeed,
expressly relying on the “Genocide Convention” strategy would limit its
effectiveness to the Al-Bashir case only, which is the sole Darfur case
containing counts of genocide.
Conclusion
The decisions passed down by the international criminal
tribunals and the ICJ have helped to clarify the definition of the crime of
genocide. As these legal institutions hear more cases, our understanding of the
crime will develop. One of the key questions for future legal forums is whether
the Convention can be used effectively not only to punish acts that have
already taken place, but also to prevent crimes and protect groups.
In parallel with the legal and judicial process, a lot
of efforts should be done in the fields of culture, matters of identity and
ethnics groups, etc. Some special circumstances may affect the capacity to
prevent genocide such as structures that exist to protect the population and
deter genocide, including effective legislative protection, having a sincere
political will to face corruption, independent judiciary and effective national
human rights institutions, presence of international actors such as UN
operations capable of protecting vulnerable groups, neutral security forces and
independent media, etc.
All these ingredients, together, can be successful in
order to prevent and fight against genocidal atrocities.
SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY
GALLAGHER,
Adrian (2013), Genocide and its Threat to Contemporary International Order,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan
I.C.J., Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment I.C.J. Reports
2007, p. 43.
JONASSOHN,
Kurt; BJÖRNSON, Karin Solveig (1998), Genocide and Gross Human Rights
Violations in Comparative Perspective, Transaction Publishers, pp. 133–135
JOYCE Frey Rebecca , Genocide and International justice, Infobase Publishing,
2009 - 389 pages.
MCGILL STAFF
(2007), 2007 Global Conference on the Prevention of Genocide – What is
Genocide?, McGill University Faculty of Law A collection of genocide
definitions by the Aegis Trust
ORENTLICHER,
Diane F. (2001), Crimes of War: A–Z Guide: Genocide, The Crimes of War
Education Project, archived from the original on 26 September 2008
SHAW, Martin
(2007), What Is Genocide?, Cambridge: Polity Press
SRINIVASAN,
(S.), Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from
Darfur, MRGI Micro-studies, September 2006.
TOTTEN
Samuel, Eric Markusen, Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the
Sudan Routledge, 11 janv. 2013 - 332 pages
TOTTEN
Samuel, Impediments to the Prevention and Intervention of Genocide,
Transaction Publishers, 23 janv. 2013 - 304 pages
TOTTEN
Samuel, The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide, Transaction Publishers,
2008 - 309 pages
TOTTEN
Samuel, The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide: An Annotated
Bibliography, Routledge, 31 mars 2008 - 1168 pages
TOTTEN
Samuel, TOTTEN Paul Robert BARTROP, Dictionary of Genocide, Greenwood
Press, 2007 - 576 pages
TOTTEN
Samuel, TOTTEN William S. PARSONS, TOTTEN Israel W. CHARNY, Century of
Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, Psychology Press, 2004 -
507 pages.
YACOUBIAN,
George S., Jr. 2003. "Evaluating the Efficacy of the International
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia." World Affairs
165 (January 1).
[1] 124 countries are States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Out of
them 34 are African States, 19 are Asia-Pacific States, 18 are from Eastern Europe, 28 are from Latin American and Caribbean
States, and 25 are from Western European and other
States.
